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¶1  Shin Dong-hyuk considered himself lucky when a prison guard chopped off the tip 
of his finger. Born and raised an inmate of a North Korean prison camp, Shin had not 
expected to receive a punishment other than execution for breaking a sewing machine, 
albeit by accident.1 Later, Shin got even luckier. In 2005, he was able to successfully 
escape the prison camp, becoming the only known North Korean defector who was born 
in prison. 
¶2  Most would hope to believe that “gulags,” the mass incarceration systems used by 
Socialist countries to suppress anti-state political factions, are a thing of the past. 
However, unbeknownst to many, their dark legacy lives on in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (“DPRK” or “North Korea”) in the form of kwan-li-so, an extensive 
system of state-authorized concentration camps.  
¶3  It is estimated that nearly 200,000 people are being held in kwan-li-so and related 
systems, often without due process and in brutal conditions, in flagrant violation of 
international human rights conventions.2 Over 400,000 prisoners have died in these 
camps over the past thirty years, from causes including starvation, death by labor, torture, 
executions, and more.3 
¶4  This issue is particularly noteworthy today, as political tensions mount in the 
Korean peninsula and beyond. As recently as January 2014, North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-Un repeatedly declared a state of war with South Korea and threatened to attack the 
U.S. with atomic weapons.4 North Korea remains one of the most militarily menacing 
nations in the world, and therefore is subject to vast media coverage about its military 
schemes, weapon development, and war threats. Meanwhile, however, little attention has 
been paid to its serious domestic issues, including its failure to comply with international 
human rights standards. 
¶5  In particular, the dearth of scholarship addressing North Korean prison camps is 
disproportionate to the gravity of the issue. Such notable silence may be a result of 
                                                        
1 Choe Sang-Hun, North Korean Defectors Tell U.N. Panel of Prison Camp Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/21/world/asia/north-korean-defectors-tell-un-panel-of-prison-
camp-abuses.html. 
2 James S. Robbins, Got Gulag? North Korea Does, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (June 9, 2005, 7:45 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/214647/got-gulag/james-s-robbins. 
3 DLA PIPER & U.S. COMM. FOR HUM. RTS. IN NORTH KOREA, FAILURE TO PROTECT: A CALL FOR THE UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACT IN NORTH KOREA 30, 34 (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/un/failure-protect-
call-un-security-council-act-north-korea/p11903 [hereinafter DLA PIPER]. 
4 Jack Kim, North Korea Threats: Pyongyang Steps up Rhetoric Against U.S. Bases in Japan and Guam, 
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/21/north-korea-
threats_n_2920984.html; Sam Kim, North Korea Reportedly Entering 'State Of War' Against South Korea, 
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/29/north-korea-state-of-
war_n_2982025.html. 
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general diplomatic and political sensitivities towards North Korea and fear of military 
retaliation. Moreover, an aggravating factor is the Kim regime’s notorious policy of 
secrecy.  
¶6  This note is based on the notion that raising awareness is the first step towards 
redress and setting the record straight about what is and is not acceptable in the eyes of 
the international community. While these “soft measures” may seem modest in light of 
the imminent need to stall the mass detainment, suffering, and deaths in North Korea, 
they are also precisely what are necessary to serve as a catalyst for further action.  
¶7  Applying political pressure on the North Korean government through extensive and 
proactive media campaign implemented by the most powerful United Nations branches is 
an unprecedented approach. Being a novel agenda, it does carry some risks, such as the 
possibility of eliciting no response from North Korea, or, worse yet, provoking a negative 
response whereby tensions will heighten. However, the aspiration is that a long-term 
change in awareness and attitude towards the preservation and dignity of human life will 
nudge North Korea in the right direction. As the international community increasingly 
participates in discussions about the North Korean prison systems, it will apply pressure 
on North Korea to increase transparency in its criminal prosecutions and detainment as 
well as compliance with the customary international laws governing the protection of 
human rights.  
¶8  It is important that the media coverage of North Korean prisoners arouse sympathy 
among the audience. This is because any media campaign must inspire action and 
mobilize a movement toward meaningful change in order to be effective. However, what 
is more important is that the coverage be a respectable, objective, and factually accurate 
narrative, rather than one that merely sensationalizes the issue.  
¶9  The media campaign must have the long-term goal of establishing a universal norm 
for how humans treat each other. Doing so will lend legitimacy to future tribunals that 
may try those accountable for crimes against humanity in North Korea. More 
importantly, however, these conciliatory and diplomatic efforts will pave the road 
towards demilitarization of North Korea as well as a peaceful reunification of the two 
Koreas. 
¶10  This note proposes to close the information gap regarding North Korean prison 
camps by calling upon the United Nations, the most prominent international organ, to 
initiate, monitor, and sustain aggressive global media coverage of kwan-li-so. The scope 
of this note does not cover criminal prosecution of North Korean officials responsible for 
the existence and operation of kwan-li-so. Contemplation of various forums for redress 
for the North Korean victims has been covered in depth elsewhere.5 Rather, the goal of 
this note is to propose a more subdued and long-term, yet equally crucial process of 
transforming political attitudes and priorities of the international community surrounding 
the issue of North Korean prison camps. 
¶11  In pursuing this particular form of humanitarian intervention, there are several 
practical considerations, not least of which is the limitation of resources, including 
funding and staffing. There is also the on-going issue of sustainability, consistency, and 
objectivity in application on an international scale. Given these challenges, this note 
proposes and evaluates two potential entities to spearhead the coordination and 
                                                        
5 See Morse H. Tan, Finding A Forum for North Korea, 65 SMU L. Rev. 765 (2012). 
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monitoring of the concerted worldwide media campaign: the United Nations Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detainment and the United Nations Security Council.  
¶12  The note will begin by presenting the state of North Korean political prisons and 
the North Korean government’s detainment policy as they are known today. Next, the 
note will provide an overview of the international response thus far, mainly through the 
mechanisms of the United Nations former Commission on Human Rights, the Special 
Rapporteur for Human Rights in North Korea, the United Nations General Assembly, 
and, most recently, the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea. The note will also outline the legal framework that governs 
the gross human rights violations that exist in the North Korean prison camps. References 
will be made to specific provisions of two of the most relevant international human rights 
laws, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Rome Statute.  
I.   WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT KWAN-LI-SO TODAY 
¶13  Kwan-li-so are prison-labor camps that house political prisoners on a large scale 
and impose forced labor upon thousands of North Koreans. They are arbitrary and extra-
judicial facilities that incarcerate not only the accused, but up to three generations of the 
accused’s family.6 Moreover, the prisoners are kept at starvation-level and forced to 
engage in severe physical labor.  
¶14  The 2004 report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of 
Representatives states, “the terrible human rights situation inside North Korea . . . has 
remained largely hidden from the outside world until the past several years.”7 For 
example, the topic of the prison camp system is not even mentioned in North Korea’s 
country report issued by the Amnesty International in 2005.8 To this day, there is not 
much known about kwan-li-so, and even the scant information available is based on 
anecdotes of escapees, which are practically unverifiable. This omission and information 
vacuum form a vicious cycle, whereby silence reinforces apathy towards the issue. Lack 
of interest, in turn, leads to lack of media coverage and discussion. This has been a 
substantial challenge for the international human rights organizations and governments.  
¶15  Of the scant sources available, the most reliable are reports by North Korean 
defectors. In the mid-1990s, a severe nationwide famine forced an unprecedented number 
of North Koreans to attempt to flee the country. One positive outcome of this tragic 
circumstance is that those who successfully defected were able to relay information to the 
outside world about the North Korean government’s human rights abuses and the prison 
camp system.9  
¶16  Today, with the help of North Korean defectors’ testimony, it is understood that 
there are six kwan-li-so in existence.10 It is estimated that each camp contains from 5,000 
to as many as 50,000 people.11 The North Korean prison camps originated in 1947, the 
                                                        
6 DLA PIPER, supra note 3, at 34.  
7 H.R. REP. 109-478 (2004), at 11.  
8 Robbins, supra note 2. 
9 DLA PIPER, supra note 3, at 34.  
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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first prisoners being landowners, religious persons, and those who supported Japan in its 
occupation of Korea.  
¶17  From the beginning, the North Korean government used prison camps as a means 
of ideological control and oppression. The North Korean State Security Department is the 
official agency in charge of investigating and punishing real and alleged political offenses 
within North Korea.12 The agency has full authority to employ secret police to locate 
those who slander the regime and punish offenders, including by imprisonment.13  
¶18  In the 1950s through the late 1960s, Kim Il-Sung’s regime targeted political 
opponents, who were declared “dangerously deluded in their political beliefs” and 
separated from the rest of the population through imprisonment.14 The crimes that 
warranted a prison term were both real and imagined. Some were incarcerated for minor 
disturbances such as expressing exasperation with the difficulty of life generally, or 
minor acts of defiance like singing a South Korean song. 
¶19  When Kim Jong-Il succeeded his father as the country’s leader in 1994, he 
expanded the political prison camps to accommodate opponents to his new regime. By 
1982, the North Korean government had sentenced over 100,000 political opponents.15 In 
the late 1980s, the government feared that reform in Eastern Europe and the collapse of 
communism threatened North Korea’s political system. As a consequence, it further 
utilized the political prison camps to quash dissidents.  
¶20  The parallel between North Korea and other communist states is undeniable. Kwan-
li-so has often been compared to Stalinist gulags, and North Korea described as a “bona 
fide Soviet state.”16 North Korean kwan-li-so resembles Soviet gulags in their size, scope, 
and purpose of political suppression. In some aspects, the North Korean system is even 
more coercive than the Soviet counterpart, as it ignores due process and pro forma 
trials.17 In North Korea, suspects are not given any notice or opportunity to defend their 
innocence. State officials simply abduct them without informing them of the offense and 
use interrogation and torture to force “confession” to the crime. Suspects are incarcerated 
without due process of trial, or being given any information as to when, if ever, they may 
be released. 
¶21  The North Korean State Security Department will incarcerate up to three 
generations of the accused’s family, including mother, father, sisters, brothers, children, 
and grandchildren.18 This practice is rooted in Kim Il-Song’s theory that the “seeds” of 
the accused must be eliminated through three generations.19 Families are often arrested 
for a family member’s “crime of high treason” without being given the specific 
allegations.  
¶22  Moreover, the prisoners are provided starvation-level food rations, despite being 
forced to engage in demanding physical labor.20 As a result, prisoners’ physical 
                                                        
12 Id. at 30. 
13 Id.  
14 DLA PIPER, supra note 3, at 33. 
15 Id. 
16 Robbins, supra note 2. 
17 Id. 
18 DLA PIPER, supra note 3, at 34. 
19 Id. at 34-35.  
20 Id. at 35-36. 
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conditions deteriorate from over-exertion and under-nourishment.21 Death and disease 
such as diarrhea are common due to malnutrition.22 Keeping the prisoners in such 
conditions serves the purpose of diminishing their morale, thereby turning these prisoners 
into more manageable subjects from the perspective of the North Korean government.23 
Food ration depends on the prisoner’s completion of work assignments, which results in a 
vicious cycle of food deprivation leading to the exhaustion, and inability to complete 
work leading to further deprivation of food.24 
¶23  Nearly twenty to twenty-five percent of the North Korean prisoners are worked to 
death each year.25 This figure does not include those who survived but became ill or 
disabled. Moreover, the deceased include children, who, at their tender age, were forced 
to engage in intense labor beyond their capacity, including farming, sewing, mining, and 
timber-cutting.  
¶24  Prison camp authorities make these tasks even more dangerous by failing to 
provide even the most basic safety gear, such as hard hats during mining. There is no 
protection against harsh weather, often causing severe frostbite that requires amputation. 
Casualties and deaths are common from work-place accidents such as cave-ins during 
mining and fallen timber during tree cutting.26  
¶25  The prison camps routinely employ torture as a means of interrogation and 
punishment. Prison guards engage in fierce beatings that cause eyes to fall out or leg 
bones to be exposed.27 As punishment, prisoners are severely restricted in their bodily 
movements, sometimes cutting off circulation to the point of crippling or death.28  
¶26  There is gross disregard for life in general. Prisoners are executed for trivial 
reasons, including eating unauthorized food. Moreover, Kim Jong-Il instituted a perverse 
incentive system rewarding guards who killed prisoners during an attempted escape.29 In 
one disturbing instance, a prison guard forced a prisoner to pretend to escape and then 
shot him in order to claim his reward.30 
¶27  Finally, forced abortion and infanticide are common practice in the prison camps.31 
Women are often trafficked across borders to China for sex trade. When they become 
pregnant, these women are sometimes returned to North Korea and forced to go under 
abortion to prevent the crossover between North Korean and Chinese races. Babies 
carried for more than eight months are birthed and immediately suffocated or abandoned 
in front of the mother.32 As illustrated by these examples, the physical and mental well-
being of countless North Koreans is devastated in the prison camps, on a daily basis. 
¶28  Lately, North Korea has gone through significant changes, most notably the death 
of Kim Jong-Il, and the succession of his son Kim Jong-Un. Since coming into power, 
                                                        
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 See id. 
24 See DLA PIPER, supra note 3, at 35-36. 
25 Id. at 37.  
26 Id. at 37-38. 
27 Id. at 39. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.  at 40. 
30 DLA PIPER, supra note 3, at 40. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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Kim Jong-Un has made repeated declarations of war and ultimatums of nuclear attack 
against South Korea and the U.S.33 Judging by his conduct thus far, Kim Jong-Un seems 
to continue his predecessors’ history of nuclear threats and aversion to foreign 
diplomacy. At the same time, South Korea and the U.S. continue to support the agenda of 
peace in the Korean peninsula. Kwan-li-so continues to exist against this backdrop of fear 
and hope, war and diplomacy.  
II.   THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REACTS 
¶29  The international community has made some effort to voice their concern regarding 
the deplorable conditions in North Korean prison camps. The discussions began with Six-
Party Talks in August 2003 involving North Korea, South Korea, the United States, 
China, Russia, and Japan, where the parties discussed various issues from disarmament to 
human rights violations in prison camps.34 Also, in 2003 the U.N.’s former Commission 
on Human Rights (“Commission”) passed its first resolution pointing out several human 
rights violations, including prison camps.35  
¶30  The same Commission also called on North Korea to allow NGOs access to the 
country to ensure that humanitarian assistance was delivered to those in need. They also 
requested that the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights engage in a dialogue with 
the North Korean government.36 
¶31  In 2004, the Commission passed a second resolution regarding North Korea 
expressing “deep concern at the precarious humanitarian situation in the country.”37 In an 
attempt to involve North Korea directly in the dialogue about human rights, the 2004 
Resolution requested that a Special Rapporteur be appointed, and urged the North Korean 
government to grant him full access to the government and the people of North Korea. 
¶32  Vitit Muntarbhorn, the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in North Korea, 
issued his first report in January 2005. In addition to commending North Korea for taking 
positive steps towards cooperating with the U.N., the report broadly suggested that North 
Korea abide by international human rights conventions and reform its laws accordingly. 
However, on March 2, 2005 the North Korean government stated its “resolute rejection” 
of the 2004 Resolution claiming that the U.N. Resolution was politically motivated.38 
¶33  The Special Rapporteur issued his second report in August 2005, elaborating on the 
issues raised in his January 2005 report and requesting that the North Korean government 
take “immediate action to prevent abuses and provide redress.”39 The Commission passed 
                                                        
33 Jack Kim, North Korea Threats: Pyongyang Steps up Rhetoric Against U.S. Bases in Japan and Guam, 
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/21/north-korea-
threats_n_2920984.html; Sam Kim, North Korea Reportedly Entering 'State Of War' Against South Korea, 
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/29/north-korea-state-of-
war_n_2982025.html. 
34 DLA PIPER, supra note 3, at 68.  
35 Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2003/10, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/L.11 (Apr. 16, 2003). 
36 Id.  
37 Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2004/13, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/2004/23 – E/CN.4/2004/127 
(Apr. 15, 2004), at 61. 
38 Letter dated 28 Feb. 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea to the United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
61st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/G/13 (Mar. 2, 2005). 
39 Id. at 74. 
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a third resolution regarding the North Korea situation in April 2005, reiterating its deep 
concern about the “continuing reports of systematic, widespread and grave violations of 
human rights.”40 The resolution voiced the Commission’s concern that the North Korean 
government had refused to cooperate with any U.N. body, including the Commission and 
the Special Rapporteur.41 
¶34  The Special Rapporteur issued his third report on January 23, 2006, in which he 
described his numerous attempts to obtain an invitation to visit North Korea.42 Finally, he 
issued his fourth report on September 27, 2006, stating that human rights abuses in North 
Korea remained “rampant” and that the North Korean government had been 
“uncooperative” with respect to his communications with them.43 As illustrated by the 
five reports by the Special Rapporteur, North Korea has generally been unreceptive to 
outside communication with regards to its human rights conditions.  
¶35  The U.N. General Assembly adopted its own resolution echoing the concerns of the 
Commission on Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur, expressing its disappointment 
with the North Korean government’s refusal to recognize the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur and about the “reports of systematic, widespread, and grave violations of 
human rights.”44  
¶36  Notwithstanding these efforts, North Korea has continued to refuse to engage in 
dialogue with the United Nations regarding its human rights violations.45  
III.   NORTH KOREA’S POSITION 
¶37  Examining North Korea’s criminal law sheds light on its official policy regarding 
detainment. The 1974 Criminal Law was guided by the policy of suppressing “anti-
revolutionary elements.”46 “Anti-revolutionary offenses” were categorized as the most 
pernicious offense to the socialist regime, and were punishable by death. Although the 
language has been softened through reform, the basic ideology of protecting the status 
quo remains.  
¶38  Consistent with its policy of denial, the North Korean Criminal Law fails to even 
mention kwan-li-so, suggesting that the institution lacks legal basis in North Korean 
                                                        
40 G.A. Res. 60/173, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/173 (Dec. 16, 2005). 
41 See id. 
42 Comm’n on Hum. Rts.,  Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any 
Part of the World: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/35 (Jan. 23, 2006).  
43 Id. at 75. 
44 G.A. Res.. 60/173, supra note 40. 
45 In March 2013, a three-member Commission of Inquiry was established by the United Nations Human 
Rights Council. The Commission had a one-year mandate to investigate allegations of systematic, 
widespread and grave violations of human rights, including possible crimes against humanity, by the North 
Korean government. In February 2014, the Commission published their report documenting human rights 
abuses, driven by “policies established at the highest level of State,” committed in North Korea. The report 
also calls for urgent action to address the rights situation in the country. UN-Mandated Human Rights 
Inquiry on DPR Korea Documents 'Widespread, Systematic Abuses, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47160#.UxlqAvldX01. 
46 In Sup Han, The 2004 Revision of Criminal Law in North Korea: A Take-off?, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L 
L. 122, 127 (2006). 
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law.47 Instead, the Criminal Procedure Law and Criminal Law mention kyo-hwa-so, 
which are prisons for standard criminals.48 Since it lacks basis even in domestic 
legislation, kwan-li-so should be characterized as truly extra-judicial, lacking any 
procedural guidance or guarantees of basic human rights. 
¶39  North Korea has gone so far as to deny that there are any human rights violations in 
the country. In 1994 it proclaimed through its official publication, The People’s Korea, 
that “there is no ‘human rights problem’ in our Republic either from the institutional or 
from the legal point of view.”49  
¶40  North Korea has maintained its position that the principle of non-interference and 
protection of national sovereignty must be observed over humanitarian intervention. 
Furthermore, North Korea has rejected the U.N.’s outreach, claiming the U.N. is 
motivated by “a plot of propaganda fabricated and persistently pursued by hostile forces” 
as part of a campaign of psychological warfare to “overthrow the State system of [North 
Korea].”50 
IV.   INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
¶41  Before discussing how to address the gross violation of human rights at North 
Korean prison camps, it is critical to examine the legal instruments that are available. 
What is the customary international law regarding fundamental civil and political rights 
of every human being, including those of North Korean detainees?  
¶42  The forcible detention, punishment, and imprisonment of the North Korean 
political prisoners violates several key international human rights principles, such as 
those contained in the twin instruments of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), which prohibit torture and persecution of vulnerable 
groups, as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome 
Statute”).51  Below is a discussion of the applicable provisions. 
¶43  The North Korean prison camp situation violates the following provisions of the 
ICCPR: right to life (Article 6); right not be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment (Article 7); right not to be held in slavery or servitude (Article 8); 
right not be held in arbitrary detention (Article 9); right for all persons deprived of liberty 
to be treated with humanity (Article 10); right to free movement (Article 12); right to 
recognition as a person before the law (Article 16); right not to be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence (Article 17); right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18); right to hold opinion without 
interference (Article 19); right to peaceable assembly (Article 21); right to freedom of 
                                                        
47 Id. at 128.  
48 Id. 
49 DLA PIPER, supra note 3, at 10.  
50 Han, supra note 46, at 131. 
51 DAVID HAWK, THE HIDDEN GULAG: THE LIVES AND VOICES OF “THOSE WHO ARE SENT TO THE 
MOUNTAINS” EXPOSING NORTH KOREA’S VAST SYSTEM OF LAWLESS IMPRISONMENT (2d. ed. 2012), 
http://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_HiddenGulag2_Web_5-18.pdf; International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 17; International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, art. 11(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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association (Article 22); and rights to equal protection and non-discrimination, including 
on grounds of political or other opinion, birth, or other status (Article 26).52 
¶44  The forcible transfer, detainment, torture and cruel treatment of North Korean 
citizens for alleged anti-state conduct or expression are clear violations of the above 
ICCPR provisions. The lack of due process in the initial arrest, for example, goes against 
Articles 9, 12, 16, and 17. The fact that the citizens are charged with and punished for 
holding an opinion (“wrong-thinking”) or forming alliances that are frowned upon by the 
state, are violations of Articles 18, 19, 21, and 26. Finally, the systematic tortures through 
physical punishment and forced starvation, as well as punishments that include execution 
for attempted escape, violate the protections guaranteed by Articles 6, 7, and 10. 
¶45  In addition to treaties like the ICCPR, reference must be made to authoritative 
international documents such as the Standard Minimum Rules and the Basic Principles 
for the Treatment of Prisoners, which are promulgated by the United Nations.53 It is also 
helpful to look at various interpretations by the Human Rights Committee.  
¶46  For instance, in Larossa v. Uruguay,54 the Committee found that the prison 
conditions in which the plaintiff was placed, with cement beds, no windows, and artificial 
light around the clock, violated Articles 7 and 10(1) of the ICCPR. In this case, even 
solitary confinement for a period of a month was found to be a violation of international 
standards. By this logic, the prison conditions in North Korea, which involve more 
extreme forms of human rights violations such as torture, physical violence, forced labor, 
and indefinite prison terms, are in violation of Articles 7 and 10(1) of the ICCPR. 
¶47  The Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court, was adopted 
on July 17, 1998, and entered into force on July 1, 2002. Today the Rome Statute is 
recognized as customary international law, with 139 signatories and 118 ratifications.55 
However, unfortunately, North Korea is conspicuously absent in the list of signatories. 
This fact complicates the issue of ICC jurisdiction over North Korean conduct.  
¶48  Nonetheless, argument can be made that the Rome Statute still applies to North 
Korea because, as mentioned above, the ICC creates customary international law, which 
is recognized as a primary source of international law by the International Court of 
Justice, the United Nations, and member states. Furthermore, although North Korea is not 
a party to the Rome Statute, the ICC may have jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
DPRK citizens, through any one of three ways: (1) the U.N. Security Council refers a 
case to it, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter; (2) a State Party refers the 
situation to the ICC; or (3) the prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio motu, 
pursuant to Article 13 of the Rome Statute.56 
¶49  Further, what makes the Rome Statute pertinent to the issue of prison camps in 
North Korea is the fact that the it identifies “crimes against humanity” as a new 
development in defining gross violations of the standards set forth by established legal 
frameworks, such as the ICCPR. The language defining this new category of “crimes 
                                                        
52 HAWK, supra note 51, at 160.  
53 Jeff Vize, Torture, Forced Confessions, and Inhuman Punishments: Human Rights Abuses in the 
Japanese Penal System, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 329, 348 (2003). 
54 Comm. on Hum. Rts., Gustavo Raul Larrosa Bequio v. Uruguay, Communication, No. 88/1981, U.N. 
Doc. A/38/40, at 180 (1983). 
55 World Signatories and Ratifications, COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romesignatures. 
56 Id. at 63-64. 
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against humanity” under the Rome Statute removes any doubt that the Rome Statute 
applies to the North Korean kwan-li-so. Indeed, the definition of “crimes against 
humanity” under the Rome Statute is reasonably flexible to extend to even non-signatory 
nations like North Korea, which makes it a powerful instrument to enforce international 
criminal standards. 
¶50  The Rome Statute allows a more complex understanding of the degrees of violation 
by filling the gap that existed between what are called “serious violations of the standards 
of the ICCPR” and “genocide” as defined in international law. For instance, arbitrary 
detainment and torture are more atrocious than “violations,” but fall short of “genocide.” 
The Rome Statute also provides a new and more workable definition of “crimes against 
humanity” 57 than previous definitions, with specific and comprehensive sub-categories. 
Owing to these new developments, the arbitrary incarceration in North Korea falls 
squarely into the new definition of "crimes against humanity" under the Rome Statute.  
¶51  First, kwan-li-so is part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the 
civilian population of North Korea, and the known consequences include murder, 
enslavement or forced labor, imprisonment, forcible transfer of population, torture, and 
sexual violence. Also applicable are the categories of persecution due to political 
orientation, enforced disappearance of persons, and causing of great suffering or serious 
injury to physical and mental health. The fact that the majority of the defined 
circumstances that constitute crimes against humanity are met by the operation of kwan-
li-so is alarming. 
¶52  An additional factor that is relevant under the Rome Statute analysis is the potential 
criminal liability of the North Korean government itself. For instance, there is an 
argument that under Article 53 of the Rome Statute, there is “a reasonable basis to 
believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the [International Criminal Court] has been 
or is being committed.”58 According to the facts established above, there is a reasonable 
                                                        
57 For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of the following acts when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack:  
a. Murder;  
b. Extermination;  
c. Enslavement;  
d. Deportation or forcible transfer of population;  
e. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of    
fundamental rules of international law;  
f. Torture;  
g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of 
sexual violence of comparable gravity;  
h. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender, . . . or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international 
law in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court;  
i. Enforced disappearance of person;  
j. The crime of apartheid;  
k. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body 
or to mental or physical health. 
Rome Statute, art. 7. 
58 Grace M. Kang, Esq., A Case for the Prosecution of Kim Jong Il for Crimes Against Humanity, 
Genocide, and War Crimes, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 51, 78 (2006). 
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basis upon which to hold the North Korean regime criminally liable for crimes against 
humanity, genocide, and war crimes. 
¶53  The North Korean government has a policy of committing crimes against 
humanity, as defined by the Rome Statute. Moreover, due to the highly centralized and 
controlled governing structure of the Kim regime, the top political officials in North 
Korea are highly likely to have knowledge of the severe abuse of the prisoners, which 
satisfies criminal intent under customary international law. Furthermore, there is neither 
accountability nor rule of law in North Korea, since its domestic laws fail to correct the 
criminal conduct of its government in carrying out the detainment policy. This satisfies 
the Article 17 requirement that domestic remedies be unavailable or inadequate before 
the International Criminal Court takes the case under its jurisdiction.  
V.   A CASE FOR INTERVENTION 
¶54  One scholar speculates that, notwithstanding North Korea’s attitude of non-
cooperation, the “diplomatic ping-pong”59 between the U.N. and North Korea holds 
promise of yielding some progress in the future. For example, North Korea revised its 
Criminal Law in 2004, which is a step forward in the direction of North Korea’s eventual 
adoption of the rule of law. North Korea’s revised Criminal Law articulates the principle 
of legality, with specific articles that go beyond vague analogies and retroactive 
language. For instance, Article 6 says, “[o]nly offenses which are clarified under the 
provisions of Criminal Law shall be criminally accountable by the state.”60 In the revised 
Criminal Law of North Korea, the ideological tone is softened, and there is heightened 
focus on the control of economic and social, rather than political, offenses.61 
¶55  In addition, North Korea has shown some respect for international human rights 
standards, albeit nominally. The Special Rapporteur noted several other positive actions 
that North Korea has taken, including becoming a signatory to four key human rights 
treaties, occasionally allowing U.N. agencies and NGOs to enter the country, warming 
relations between North Korea and other countries, and having some legal and operations 
infrastructure that can help promote and protect human rights.62 As a party to the treaties, 
the North Korean government has submitted country reports to the U.N. monitoring 
committees such as the former Human Rights Commission.63 
¶56  Moreover, as insulated and secretive as North Korea is, it is still susceptible to 
pressures from the outside. For example, North Korea has been denying the existence of 
prison camps for years. However, when faced with commercial satellite photos of the 
prisons and testimonials from ex-prisoners, North Korea reportedly closed or otherwise 
downsized or moved some camps into other remote areas.64 Yet another example of the 
DPRK’s awareness of outside pressures is its revision of its Criminal Law.  
¶57  Nonetheless, the fact remains that North Korea is ruled under a dictatorship and is 
hostile toward other nations. While it is a signatory to key international conventions, it 
                                                        
59 Han, supra note 46, at 132.  
60 Id. at 124; The 1950 Criminal Law, art. 6 (1950) (N. Korea).  
61 Han, supra note 46, at 124.  
62 DLA PIPER, supra note 3, at 72. 
63 Han, supra note 46, at 130-131. 
64 Id. at 132. 
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has not complied with their terms. There is a need for a politically viable alternative to 
coercion, such as unilateral sanctions, in order to bring North Korea in line with 
international human rights standards. At the same time, given the non-cooperation by the 
North Korean government, the solution should not require exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, and instead have far-reaching jurisdiction and enforceability.  
¶58  Presumably, no one can predict North Korea’s reaction to intervention, whether it 
be forceful or diplomatic. Therefore, the international community must take a process-
oriented approach, whereby success is measured in terms of moving forward in the right 
direction, rather than in terms of the unlikely prospect of DPRK’s swift abolishment of 
kwan-li-so. In this regard, the most practical measure is to apply public pressure and 
make known to North Korea that there will be political consequences if there is inaction 
on their part to increase compliance with the ICCPR and the Rome Statute. In the long-
term, international oversight and intervention will pressure North Korea to further revise 
its criminal law and increase compliance with the above-mentioned standards. 
¶59  Specifically, the first and necessary step is spreading information to countries other 
than North Korea about the very existence of kwan-li-so and its deplorable conditions, as 
well as providing updates on any developments. This is a collaborative process which 
requires utilizing news networks, the Internet, and other media sources. Moreover, to 
increase effectiveness of an aggressive media campaign, there needs to be a centralized 
monitoring mechanism, one that is reputable and financially equipped. 
VI.   CONVENTIONAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN THROUGH U.N. BODIES 
¶60  In today’s world, it is difficult to envision a global media campaign that does not 
use the Internet as its main platform. Why involve a U.N. agency when the dialogue can 
develop organically through user-generated content? The role of the Internet has 
expanded with the technological change over the past ten years. For example, social 
media has a growing presence in progressive political change.65 The term “Twitter 
revolution” refers to user-generated, spontaneous interaction on the social networking site 
Twitter.com to organize web-based, coordinated activism. As an example, the American 
Red Cross used Twitter to raise over $8 million U.S. dollars for Haitian relief.66 Today, 
more than ever, any media campaign must use the web in order to be relevant. 
¶61  In the case of North Korea, however, web-based media and user-generated social 
media are not the best option. To begin with, North Korea severely limits Internet access 
to the most elite members of society.67 Furthermore, as Malcom Gladwell has argued, 
social media is ill-suited for long-term social or political change for a number of 
reasons.68 Social networking sites are known to create weak ties and low-risk activism 
that is often short-lived. In other words, while user-generated content may inspire rapid 
                                                        
65 Sarah Joseph, Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 145 
(2012). 
66 Mary Kate Cary, 5 Ways New Media Are changing Politics, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Feb. 4, 
2010), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/02/04/5-ways-new-media-are-changing-politics. 
67 Martyn Williams, North Korea Moves Quietly Onto the Internet, COMPUTER WORLD (June 10, 2010), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9177968/North_Korea_moves_quietly_onto_the_Internet?taxono
myId=18&pageNumber=2. 
68 Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 4, 
2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell. 
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exchange of information, it is not a forum for lasting, meaningful dialogue that will bring 
about change in North Korea.  
¶62  Having a U.N. agency coordinate a centralized and deliberate campaign, on the 
other hand, lends legitimacy, credibility, and longevity to the cause of raising awareness 
about kwan-li-so. While information may not be as easily retransmitted as user-generated 
content via the Internet, the U.N., as a prominent international peace-keeping entity, will 
nonetheless attract a large audience. Moreover, the U.N. is equipped to provide access to 
information as well as serve as an established platform for conversation and debate.  
¶63  Given the new leader Kim Jong-Un’s recent nuclear threats and the mounting 
tension in the Korean peninsula, it is vital that any media coverage of North Korea be 
tactful. In carrying out a media campaign, there must be use of politically sensitive 
language that describes the situation accurately but also neutrally. Involving the U.N. 
organs mentioned above will allow centralized control over the quality and content of 
information exchange. 
VII.   WORKING GROUP ON ARBITRARY DETENTION AND THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL 
¶64  While North Korea has refused to answer to its main organs, including the U.N. 
General Assembly, former Commission on Human Rights, and Special Rapporteur on 
Human Rights in North Korea, the U.N. remains the most prominent international body 
to police violations of human rights. The goal of protecting human rights is explicitly 
stated in the U.N. Charter: “[t]he U.N. shall promote universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.”69 This principle was 
reinforced in the Millennium Declaration, and specified in the High-Level Panel report in 
2004: “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.” The report expanded on the 
responsibility to protect doctrine, affirming the “obligation of a state to protect welfare of 
its own people.”70 
¶65  One possible solution to the North Korean prisons camps is to involve the United 
Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (“WGAD”). WGAD is a body within the 
U.N. Human Rights Council that issues opinions regarding the detention of individuals in 
various countries. The WGAD works by utilizing global institutions and “soft law,” its 
methods being quasi-judicial and its opinions non-binding.71 
¶66  Because of its informal nature, the WGAD largely depends on civil society to carry 
out its recommendations. In doing so, it establishes and maintains regulatory networks or 
“global administration,” affecting international rule of law and standards of conduct. 
While it lacks enforcement power, WGAD can act as a catalyst for countries to adhere to 
international human rights treaties and conventions.72 It can facilitate information sharing 
among civil society and nations, encouraging a momentum for change in North Korea. 
The WGAD also has the procedural advantage of not requiring the exhaustion of 
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domestic remedies to file a case.73 This allows WGAD to circumvent North Korean 
government’s resistance or stalling tactics. 
¶67  Some speculate that the WGAD, like most U.N. entities, is politically motivated in 
its case selection. For example, WGAD investigated the situation of detainees held by the 
U.S. government in Guantánamo Bay, while ignoring other similar detention facilities 
like the North Korean kwan-li-so.74 Commissioning the WGAD to resolve the issue of 
arbitrary detainment in North Korea would allow it to overcome its appearance of 
political bias. 
¶68  Scholars Jared Genser and Margaret Winterkorn-Meikle conclude from four case 
studies that the success of WGAD’s involvement is affected by various factors including 
the country in question and the individuals who are detained.75 For instance, the more 
compelling the personal profile of the detained and the facts surrounding the arrest, such 
as the involvement of torture and foreign citizenship, the more likely it is that the case 
will attract international attention. The sensitivity of the detaining country to international 
pressures may also affect the outcome. The case studies suggest, however, that even 
intransigent countries like China and North Korea can be susceptible to pressure.76 
¶69  Applying this to the situation in North Korea, the prospect of U.N. intervention is 
greater when it involves foreign nationals. A case that was first filed to the Working 
Group in 1995 involved a South Korean, Shin Sook Ja, who was detained against her will 
in North Korea since 1985.77 Recently in March 2012, WGAD called on North Korea to 
inquire about the fate of Shin. Shin was reportedly interned in the notorious Yodok 
concentration camp with her two daughters, Oh Hae Won and Oh Kyu Won. The North 
Korean government responded in April, saying that Shin died of hepatitis, but refused to 
provide detailed information about the current situation of the two daughters or rationale 
for their detention. In Opinions adopted on May 2, 2012, the WGAD declared the years-
long detention as arbitrary and in violation of international law.78 
¶70  The WGAD also acknowledged that it was “aware of the disturbing reports from 
non-governmental organizations and other sources in the public domain alleging 
widespread arbitrary detention and links to forced labour” in North Korea, and noted that 
under certain circumstances, “widespread or systematic imprisonment or other severe 
deprivation of liberty in violation of the fundamental rules of international law may 
constitute crimes against humanity.”79 Involving the WGAD is advantageous because of 
its history of interest in the North Korean prison camps issue. 
¶71  Involving the WGAD is further advantageous because of its pre-existing ties to 
international civil society and news groups. WGAD’s participation in addressing the 
North Korean prison camp issue will help frame it as humanitarian crisis and increase 
further dialogue and information-sharing. Going through the WGAD will open ways to 
involve the North Korean government in the dialogue as well. Because humanitarian 
crimes is a serious allegation and a politically sensitive issue, there needs to be a 
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politically neutral organization to objectively, accurately, and credibly research the 
situation and make a balanced recommendation. 
¶72  A second approach is to involve the U.N. Security Council under the international 
legal doctrine of a nation’s responsibility to protect its people. A 2006 report 
commissioned by former President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Havel, former Prime 
Minister of Norway Kjell Magne Bondevik, and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Elie Wiesel, 
makes this proposal.80 The report, authored jointly by the international law firm DLA 
Piper and the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, calls for Security 
Council’s intervention in the situation in North Korea, where the government failed in its 
responsibility to protect its own citizens in two major areas, food policy and treatment of 
political prisoners.81  
¶73  The U.N. Security Council is charged with maintaining peace, and is legally 
mandated to make binding decisions regarding human rights. Therefore, the report 
alleges, the Security Council assumes the duty to protect the North Korean population, 
since its own government has failed to do so by inflicting serious suffering, harm, and 
repression upon its people. This principle rests on the concept that sovereignty involves 
both rights and responsibilities, and that failure to uphold sovereign responsibilities may 
warrant humanitarian intervention.82 
¶74  On September 20, 2005, during the World Summit, the leaders in the U.N. General 
Assembly adopted a statement in which they said: “. . . [W]e are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council . . . [if] 
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from . . . crimes 
against humanity.”83 Subsequently, this statement was unanimously endorsed in 
Resolution 1674 by the Security Council.84 These principles comport with the ideals of 
the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his Millennium Report to the General 
Assembly, whereby each member state has a responsibility to protect both their own 
citizens and those of other states.85 
¶75  Given these mandates, the U.N. Security Council is an appropriate entity to 
publicize the issue of kwan-li-so in North Korea. The Security Coucil has the authority to 
engage in dialogue with North Korea regarding its detainment policy. For instance, it 
may adopt a non-punitive resolution that outlines North Korea’s failure to protect their 
people, and request that North Korea embrace the U.N.’s humanitarian assistance and 
release political prisoners who are wrongfully detained.86  Moreover, in case North Korea 
fails to comply with the non-punitive resolution, the Security Council can always resort 
to adopting a binding resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. In addition to 
having these powers, the Security Council also has the advantage of having established 
relations with the global community and media channels.  
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VIII.   CONCLUSION 
¶76  The very existence of state-instituted mass concentration camps in North Korea is 
offensive to the principles of international human rights. What is more alarming is that 
the human rights violations are not isolated incidents, but rather form a systematic 
pattern, exposing all North Korean citizens to the risk of inhumane treatment at the whim 
of the government. 
¶77  The North Korean prisoners, arrested without warrants, are unduly deprived of 
physical liberty in violation of due process protections of humanitarian treaties such as 
the ICCPR. The shock multiplies when considering the fact that the prisoners, including 
children, are often worked to death in unsafe conditions and are intentionally kept 
undernourished and tortured as a means of control.   
¶78  In order to address this issue, the world must acknowledge that the operation of the 
political prison camps in North Korea constitutes “crimes against humanity” as defined in 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Furthermore, foreign states can exert pressure on North 
Korea to comply with the international rule of law through coordinated media campaigns 
designed by U.N. bodies such as the WGAD or the Security Council. Historically, news 
media has served an important role in giving a voice to the voiceless. By connecting 
individuals, NGOs, and states to build an informal network of information-sharing and 
dialogue on the issue, the global community will be better equipped to apply political 
pressure on North Korea’s detainment policy, which remains the most egregious form of 
human rights violation that exists today. 
